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Combining Private Insurance
with Public Programs 
to Achieve Universal Coverage
John H. Goddeeris
Michigan State University
For many who embrace universal health insurance as an objective, 
a tax-financed state plan that would cover all residents is simply too 
radical a restructuring of the current health care system. In 1987, the 
share of personal health expenditures accounted for by private health 
insurance amounted to about 3.1 percent of gross national product, or 
$552 per capita (Letsch, Levit, and Waldo 1988). This is more than 
half of the amount raised by all state taxes combined in that year (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1989). So even before adding in the cost of ex 
tending coverage to the uninsured, merely shifting what is now financed 
through private insurance into the public sector would require, on 
average, a more than 50 percent increase in the size of state govern 
ment budgets. To the extent that financing is merely shifted, wages and 
profits would rise in some combination to offset the tax increase, on 
average, but individual businesses and workers are understandably wary 
of how such an enormous shift would affect them. In addition, pro 
viders of medical services tend not to look favorably on the idea of con 
centrating so much buying power into government hands. The health 
insurance industry worries about what role would be left for it to play 
in such a revamped system.
A natural alternative is to build on the current employment-based in 
surance system, requiring or encouraging more employers to provide 
coverage for their workers, and adding a "safety net" public program 
or set of programs to accommodate the remaining uninsured. Such an 
approach is surely less threatening to providers and to health insurers, 
and at least at first glance it appears that it might be accomplished with 
little expansion of state government budgets. Numerous studies have 
shown that as many as three-quarters of the current uninsured are in
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households with at least one worker (Brown 1989). If employers could 
be induced to cover most of that group, so it is hoped, picking up the 
remainder with public coverage might be manageable.
What would seem to be the main virtue of this approach the fact 
that it is an incremental change that builds from the system already in 
place may, however, be its fatal flaw. By extending insurance coverage 
to all, it would boost substantially the demand for medical care in a 
system that already is ineffective in controlling the rate of increase of 
costs. ! It would be administratively simpler to implement than a single 
state insurance plan (because it would rely on existing institutions), but 
over the long run it would not reduce the enormous administrative costs 
of the system in the way that a move to a single plan could (Himmel- 
stein and Woolhandler 1989). In fact, by causing many more two-earner 
households to get coverage for each earner, it would create additional 
problems of coordination of benefits and probably add overhead cost 
to the system.
Universal coverage by this route is also likely to require higher state 
expenditures than it first appears. Most of the uninsured do indeed have 
some connection to the workforce, but the working uninsured tend to 
earn quite low wages or be employed only part time or part of the year. 
Employers will be very reluctant to bear the cost of insuring them. It 
is also true that many poor individuals and families who are now counted 
as insured pay for their own nongroup coverage out-of-pocket or must 
pay the full premiums to receive coverage from employers. With a public 
safety net available, many of them could drop their current insurance 
and move to subsidized public coverage. Employers who now cover 
their workers only reluctantly might also find it advantageous to drop 
coverage and turn their employees over to the public sector. These 
possibilities are explored quantitatively later in this chapter, using data 
from Michigan.
Expanding Private Coverage
Proponents of this approach to universal coverage see private insurance 
at the center, expanding its current role, with the state ready to support
Combining Private Insurance with Public Programs 79
those who would remain uncovered. It is therefore appropriate to focus 
the discussion first on the steps that would be taken to expand 
employment-based coverage, as these will determine the size and com 
position of the population left to be covered publicly. There is a broad 
range of possibilities as to who among the current uninsured would be 
affected by a mandate directed at employers. Employers might be re 
quired by law to provide coverage to their employees, or they might 
be given an option of paying a special tax instead. Coverage of 
dependents might or might not be required. Exemptions or special rules 
might apply to some types of workers (e.g., part-time or seasonal 
employees) or types of firms (small or new businesses).
Approaches Implemented or Proposed
We can gain a sense of the range of options being considered by look 
ing at several routes to expanding employer coverage already im 
plemented or proposed. Hawaii is the one state with real experience; 
it has had mandated health insurance since the passage of its Prepaid 
Health Care Act in 1974 (American Hospital Association 1988). 
Employers there must provide health insurance for those workers who 
have completed at least four consecutive weeks of work, are working 
at least 20 hours per week, and whose monthly wage is at least 86.67 
times the minimum hourly. Employees are only obligated to contribute 
1.5 percent of gross wages toward the premium. The employer must 
offer dependent coverage, but is not required to pay for it. Some groups 
are exempted, including government employees, seasonal farm workers, 
and workers in family-owned businesses.
Massachusetts has gained much notoriety as the second state to legislate 
an expansion of employer-provided insurance (Enthoven and Kronick 
1989). It seeks to induce coverage by taxing firms that do not provide 
it at 12 percent of wages, up to $1,680 per employee. The tax is not 
scheduled to take effect until 1992, so no experience with it yet exists. 
Employers with five or fewer employees, temporary or seasonal 
employees, and employees working less than 20 hours per week are 
all to be excluded. Employees with insurance coverage from some other 
source may also decline coverage, and the employer need not pay a tax.
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Some proposals for mandating coverage at the federal level have also 
been widely discussed. One is the Basic Health Benefits for All 
Americans Act, introduced in Congress by Senator Kennedy and 
Representative Waxman. It would require that employers provide 
coverage for employees working at least 17.5 hours per week, as well 
as for dependents if they are not covered elsewhere. Employed 
dependents could retain coverage through their parents' plans. Employers 
would be required to pay 80 percent of the premium for employees work 
ing at least 25 hours per week and a smaller share for those working 
between 17.5 and 24 hours. A federal subsidy to small businesses for 
costs in excess of 5 percent of gross revenues is also included.
Another proposal is the "Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s" 
(Enthoven and Kronick 1989). 2 Under it, employers would be required 
to cover all employees working at least 25 hours per week, along with 
their dependents not otherwise covered. For part-time and seasonal 
employees, the employer could instead pay a tax of 8 percent of wages 
up to $1,800 per worker. For small businesses, payments for health 
benefits would be capped at 8 percent of total payroll.
Issues Surrounding Expanded Private Coverage
The similarities and differences among these approaches provide some 
food for thought for states interested in expanding employer-provided 
coverage.
1. Legal Mandate or Tax Incentives? The federal proposals and the 
Hawaii law require that employers provide coverage, at least for full- 
time workers. This may not be an option for a state at this time; in fact, 
it violates the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). When 
the Hawaii law was tested in court, it was ruled to be preempted by 
ERISA, although a later amendment to ERISA made an exception for 
the Hawaii case. In the current climate of strong business opposition 
to mandated benefits, 3 further exceptions seem unlikely.
The alternative to a direct mandate is a so-called "play or pay" tax, 
to which firms not providing health insurance benefits are subject, as 
in Massachusetts. 4 Even apart from the legal difficulties with mandating, 
this approach has certain advantages. In principle, the tax can be set
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high enough that nearly all firms will provide coverage rather than pay 
it, so it does not necessarily lead to fewer individuals gaining coverage. 
At the same time, it preserves an element of choice for the employer.
More important, mandating almost of necessity involves exceptions. 
Employers of low-wage workers employed only a few hours a week 
cannot be expected to guarantee health insurance coverage, nor, perhaps, 
can a small start-up business not yet proven financially viable. But mak 
ing exceptions means drawing lines, raising questions of fairness be 
tween similar cases that fall on opposite sides of the division. Further 
more, business decisions are distorted by the presence of these excep 
tions. If health insurance coverage need not be provided to those work 
ing less than, say, 20 hours per week, 25-hour employees may be shifted 
to 18 hours. If firms with five or fewer employees are exempt, deci 
sions about expanding (or contracting) will be influenced by this fact.
Use of the tax may eliminate the need for all or at least most excep 
tions. While employers of part-time or very low-wage workers should 
not be expected to make the same contribution to health insurance 
coverage as others, they can be required to contribute in proportion 
to wages paid. This seems more fair than exempting some types of 
workers entirely, it reduces certain labor market distortions, and it pro 
vides a source of revenue for partially financing the coverage of those 
who will not get insurance through their employers. In the remainder 
of this discussion, I assume that coverage is not to be legally mandated, 
but rather induced through the use of a tax.
2. What Must the Employer Do to Avoid the Tax? One possibility is 
that employers are given a credit, dollar-for-dollar against tax owed, 
for payments for health care coverage made on behalf of employees. 
The problem with this approach is that it gives no incentive to spend 
less on coverage than an employer's maximum total tax liability a dollar 
saved on coverage just becomes an additional tax dollar owed. The 
employer's incentive for cost consciousness in purchasing insurance is 
thereby attenuated. In addition, it is desirable to set the tax liability rather 
high to discourage firms from opting out of providing coverage. The 
combination of a high tax liability and dollar-for-dollar credit could 
stimulate additional spending on health coverage for those who are 
already well insured, contributing further to growing health costs.
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The alternative is to waive the tax if some specified share (80 per 
cent is commonly suggested) of the premium for a "qualified plan" 
is paid by the employer, regardless of the cost to the employer. In that 
way, a dollar saved in purchasing coverage goes directly back to the 
firm, enhancing its incentive to buy wisely. This approach requires that 
a qualified plan be defined, and raises the possibility that much cur 
rently held coverage may be ruled inadequate. But if truly universal 
coverage for a basic set of services is the goal, it makes sense to re 
quire that employer-provided coverage meet certain criteria. Defining 
a qualified plan also provides an opportunity to assure that particular 
cost-containment features be included, if that is desired.
3. Coverage of Dependents and Those Currently in Public Programs. 
Except for the Hawaii case, in all of the examples discussed above 
employers who provide coverage must cover dependents of their 
employees. In light of the large number of current uninsured who are 
dependents (mainly children) of workers (see chapter 2 of this volume), 
such a requirement seems a natural element of this strategy for univer 
sal coverage. In fact, it is probably good policy to let workers who are 
dependent children of other workers get their coverage through their 
parents, rather than their own employers. Families would be kept 
together for insurance purposes, reducing administrative costs to at least 
some degree. More important, very young workers usually earn low 
wages and have high job turnover rates. Requiring their own employers 
to provide insurance or even pay a tax may be particularly burdensome, 
and may have adverse employment effects.
Some workers or dependents of workers may have insurance coverage 
from existing government programs, especially Medicare or Medicaid. 
Because federal funds contribute heavily to the finance of these pro 
grams (Medicare is entirely federally financed, Medicaid about half, 
with some variation across states), it is probably not in the interest of 
a state to encourage that this coverage be replaced by an employer. In 
particular, the requirement that employers provide coverage or pay a 
tax probably should not extend to employees 65 and over, who are almost 
always eligible for Medicare. Excluding the elderly may, however, lead 
to political problems or charges of inequity if the basic package of
Combining Private Insurance with Public Programs 83
services available to all the nonelderly is perceived as more extensive 
than what Medicare offers.
4. Efforts to Expand Availability of Coverage. While the phenomenon 
of workers without insurance coverage is by no means limited to small 
businesses, it is well documented that small firms are much less likely 
to offer coverage than are larger ones. An important reason is that 
premium costs for similar coverage are much higher for small firms. 
Available evidence on the magnitude of the difference is sketchy, but 
a difference in cost of $40 per $100 of benefits between a firm with 
fewer than 10 employees and one with more than 100 employees is 
probably a conservative estimate (American Hospital Association 1988; 
Danzon 1989). These cost differences stem from higher administrative 
and marketing costs for insuring small firms, and from insurers' con 
cerns about adverse selection.
A reduction in that cost differential would by itself increase the number 
of small businesses offering insurance. Without a reduction, even rather 
strong tax incentives might not be enough to induce provision by very 
many additional small firms. Most proposals for expanding private 
coverage therefore include attempts to enhance the availability of in 
surance and improve the terms upon which it is offered to small firms. 
One option is for the state to create a single large insurance pool, which 
might also contain those gaining public coverage. Firms could be per 
mitted to buy into the pool on a community-rated basis (the same rates 
would be available for all firms within a particular area of the state), 
with different rates for individual, couple, and family coverage.
This approach, with one large pool encompassing most of the cur 
rent uninsured, would be in essence a scaled-down version of a state 
insurance plan, with many of the attendant advantages and disadvan 
tages. Marketing costs could be considerably reduced, at least some 
administrative economies could be realized, and if enrollment in the 
pool were large enough, problems of adverse selection would be 
minimized. Some firms would, in effect, subsidize others under such 
an arrangement, however. Each employer would pay premiums intended 
to reflect the costs of providing coverage to an "average" firm with 
a similar mix of workers by family type, but not all firms are average. 
Firms who employ workers at higher-than-average risk, due to age or
84 Combining Private Insurance with Public Programs
other factors, would pay the same premiums as everyone else, and the 
extra costs of their coverage would be spread across all participants 
in the plan.
The implications for health care costs of having a single large pool 
are also very important to consider. While the pool concentrates the 
buying power of small firms and thereby gives them some clout in the 
market, it also blunts their individual incentive to use that power effec 
tively. If a firm has only a single option for purchasing insurance (i.e., 
through the pool) at rates over which it has no control, the firm has 
no role to play in assuring that it receives good coverage at a reasonable 
cost. Incentives for cost control can of course be built into the benefit 
package, with copayments, deductibles, and so forth. To a large ex 
tent, however, the responsibility for controlling costs (and assuring quali 
ty) would fall on the administrators of the pool.
Alternatively, market competition can be relied on for cost control 
and quality assurance, along the lines suggested by Enthoven and Kronick 
(1989). Competing qualified insurance plans might be made available 
to small businesses, with a state agency serving as a broker, certifying 
which plans are qualified, providing information to firms to facilitate 
comparisons among plans, managing the enrollment process, and 
generally administering the rules of the game. The basic idea is that 
giving firms a choice provides a better opportunity to satisfy individual 
preferences, and promotes competition among insurers to hold down 
costs while maintaining high quality.
But the most thoughtful proponents of this approach recognize that 
managing competition is essential and by no means easy (Enthoven 1986, 
1988). There are difficult questions regarding the dimensions along 
which insurers should be permitted to compete. On what bases, for ex 
ample, should they be permitted to set different premiums for different 
firms? Given the opportunity, insurers will compete to attract firms with 
relatively healthy workers. The most obvious way to do so is to charge 
lower premiums to firms with younger, healthier workforces. If this 
is permitted, firms employing workers who are bad health risks (and 
in a firm with few employees it may only take one case of serious ill 
ness) may find no good options available to them. They will choose 
to let their employees turn to public coverage, which will become a 
dumping ground for those at highest risk.
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Requiring insurers to community rate would not eliminate all these 
problems. If required to community rate, insurers might attempt to tailor 
the benefit packages they offer to be particularly attractive to the healthy, 
or in subtle ways make it difficult for the chronically ill to receive covered 
services. Firms of moderate size expecting their experience to be bet 
ter than average would have an incentive to self-insure, if that is still 
an option.
An important but still unanswered question about the competitive ap 
proach favored by Enthoven and Kronick is whether sufficient numbers 
of insurers would be willing to come forward and comply with the rules 
of the game, so that the potential benefits of choice and competition 
could actually be achieved.
Likely Effects on Firms and Workers
Employer Responses to a "Play or Pay" Tax
If employers are given a choice of providing insurance or paying a 
tax, it is no simple matter to predict how many individuals would gain 
employer-provided coverage under any particular plan. Surely the firm 
would look at which option, tax or coverage, is cheaper from its point 
of view. But employers have an interest in keeping their workers hap 
py, so they will also be influenced by what the worker prefers. 5 The 
employer will be less likely to provide insurance if good public coverage 
is available free to workers than if an uncovered worker faces a premium 
or tax for public coverage in addition to the employer's tax. Complicating 
the firm's problem is the fact that it cannot decide on an employee-by- 
employee basis whether to provide coverage or pay the tax, but rather 
must make blanket decisions that apply at least to broad groups of 
employees. 6 High-wage workers in predominantly low-wage firms may 
end up without insurance from their employers (because it is not worth 
while to cover the entire firm). The converse would also be true.
Unless the tax rate is set very high, however, it is likely that for many 
low-wage and part-time workers employers will find it cheaper to pay 
the tax rather than provide coverage. Suppose, for example, that the 
tax rate is 10 percent and a worker is employed 20 hours per week
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and earning $5 per hour. The tax owed would be $10 per week or about 
$40 per month, far less than the cost of insurance coverage, even for 
a single individual.
It is appealing to suppose that all firms already providing coverage 
would continue to do so when the additional tax inducement is added, 
but this is unlikely. In many cases, the current coverage may not meet 
the standards for a qualified plan, the employer may be paying less than 
the share of the premium required, or the employer may not be cover 
ing dependents. The public safety net could also provide a better alter 
native to employer group coverage than is currently available for most 
workers. For these reasons, at least some employers now paying a share 
of the costs of their employees' coverage would choose to drop coverage 
and pay the tax instead. Many workers now counted as having employer 
group coverage would thus move to public coverage under this sort of 
package.
Incidence of the Costs of New Coverage 
and Labor Market Effects
Who would bear the costs of new employer-provided coverage and 
how the package would affect labor markets depend on the interaction 
of a number of factors, including the nature of public coverage and the 
terms upon which it is made available to those not covered in the 
workplace. The analysis is pursued in more detail in chapter 8. As a 
first approximation, however, standard economics suggests that in the 
long run the money wages of those who gain coverage would fall by 
about the cost of coverage to the employer. This conclusion is based 
on two presumptions. First, firms make employment decisions on the 
basis of total compensation per worker (wages plus benefits); they will 
only choose to hire the same number of workers if compensation does 
not change. Second, the supply of workers (and work hours) will be 
about the same at either wage level. This simple analysis has very strong 
implications. It says that those who gain employer-provided coverage 
will, for the most part, pay for it themselves (in the form of lower wages), 
and that total labor costs, business profits, and prices will therefore be 
little affected.
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These predictions may be substantially correct, but they need to be 
qualified in several important ways. First, the phrase "in the long run" 
deliberately sidesteps the issue of what happens right away. While some 
employers would cut wages if forced to add insurance, others may find 
it impossible or unwise to do so (for example, due to existing collec 
tive bargaining agreements). Their workers would get smaller wage in 
creases than otherwise, until eventually the difference in wage level 
had compensated for the cost of insurance. In the meantime, however, 
those firms would suffer lower profits, would (to the extent possible) 
pass some of their higher costs into prices, and in some cases would 
not survive.
Second, the presumption that labor supply is unaffected by changes 
in wage rates and insurance coverage is not entirely accurate, particularly 
for two-earner couples. Empirical studies have shown that decisions 
about whether and how much to work by the lower-earning spouse are 
rather strongly influenced by the terms of compensation. Frequently, 
these secondary earners already have insurance through a spouse's job. 
Forcing their own employers to provide coverage (or pay a tax) will 
reduce the money wages the employers are willing to offer, and thereby 
reduce the workers' incentive to work. Employers will in turn find such 
secondary earners more difficult and expensive to hire.
The numbers of secondary earners affected in this way are quite large. 
Analyses of national proposals for mandated insurance coverage (Gor 
don 1988; Thorpe 1989) have suggested that, of all workers gaining 
insurance under a federal mandate, roughly half already have coverage 
through an employed family member.
Finally, for workers at or near the legal minimum wage, wages can 
not be reduced enough to compensate for the added costs of coverage. 
If wages cannot be reduced at all, the cost of coverage (or the tax) is 
effectively an add-on to the minimum wage. For those close to the 
minimum wage, it is likely that most employers will find it cheaper 
to pay the tax than to provide coverage, and hence the tax rate becomes 
an upper bound on the extra increase in labor cost felt by the employer. 
Recent empirical studies have found that employment of minimum wage 
workers declines by about 1 to 3 percent in response to a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage (Brown 1988). A 10 percent payroll tax
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would have a similar effect. 7 A higher tax rate would induce more in 
surance coverage on behalf of low-wage workers, but it would also create 
more adverse employment effects while leading to higher prices and 
lower profits for those firms that employ such workers.
Costs of New Public Programs
No attempt to expand the reach of insurance in the workplace can 
by itself lead to universal coverage. Although most of the uninsured 
have some connection to the labor force, there are still large numbers 
who have none and who do not qualify for any existing public insurance 
program. A universal system needs a safety net program or set of pro 
grams to assure that they are covered. Those who have no proof of other 
insurance could be assessed (probably through the existing state tax 
system) an income-based premium. They might then be given Medicaid- 
style coverage, or placed in a new large insurance pool that also in 
cludes employees of small businesses. If a more competitive approach 
is desired, this population could be given vouchers and, where possi 
ble, allowed to choose among competing qualified plans. Issues of equity 
(as well as work incentives) could arise if the level of coverage 
guaranteed is perceived as less attractive than Medicaid.
As discussed at the outset, an obvious appeal of this route to univer 
sal coverage is that it requires a much smaller expansion of govern 
ment budgets than would an entirely tax-financed system. The hope  
not entirely without foundation is that the additional commitment of 
state dollars required might be held to an acceptable magnitude. After 
all, most workers and their families already have coverage, and most 
of the uninsured are in households with at least one worker. If coverage 
could be extended further in the workplace, and no one lost coverage 
they now hold, a relatively small residual group might be left to be picked 
up in the public sector.
What becomes clear on a close examination of the data, however, 
is that depending on exactly how the total package is designed, large 
numbers of individuals who are currently insured could move to heavi 
ly subsidized public coverage. The key to seeing this point is to recognize
Combining Private Insurance with Public Programs 89
that many individuals now have private coverage and are counted as 
insured, yet are quite poor. Thorpe (1989) has estimated that for the 
nation as a whole in 1987, 6.7 million individuals in poverty households 
had private insurance, as did an additional 4.5 million individuals in 
households under 125 percent of the poverty level. Some of them got 
group coverage through employers, but paid much or all of the cost 
themselves. Others purchased their own nongroup insurance. (Thorpe 
estimated that altogether about 10 million individuals had only such 
coverage.) Given their low incomes, it is likely that much of this coverage 
is quite limited and would not satisfy standards for a qualified plan. 
Unless the tax rate is set quite high, few in this group can be expected 
to gain employer-provided coverage, and many may lose the partial 
employer support that they now have. Depending again on the tax rate, 
others at incomes substantially above poverty may lose private coverage. 
The split between private or public coverage might be largely a mat 
ter of indifference from a policy perspective if the taxes paid by 
employers plus supplemental taxes directly on individuals covered the 
costs of the newly publicly insured. But this too would not happen, even 
at quite high tax rates.
An Analysis of Michigan Data
These ideas may be illustrated with data from Michigan. For other 
states interested in this approach to universal coverage, the method of 
analysis may be of more interest than the quantitative results. I have 
estimated the net increase in public insurance coverage under the kind 
of package being discussed here, using data from the March 1988 Cur 
rent Population Survey (CPS). 8 The details assumed for the package 
are as follows.
All employers must provide coverage to all employees, and spouses 
and dependents not otherwise covered, or pay a payroll tax. The only 
exceptions are that any workers who have coverage under an existing 
government program (Medicaid, Medicare, or CHAMPUS, a federal 
program for dependents of military personnel) need not be covered by 
the employer, and workers who are under 18 and living with parents 
or between 18 and 22 and students are to get coverage through their
90 Combining Private Insurance with Public Programs
parents. Three tax rates are considered: 10, 15 and 20 percent. 
Presumably, a ceiling on the amount of tax owed per employee would 
be included in such a package. I do not specify one for my analysis, 
assuming instead that all workers above particular earnings levels would 
be provided coverage by their employers.
Those who are not already covered in a public program and do not 
get coverage from an employer or purchase it themselves are automatical 
ly participants in a new public insurance program. For that they are 
assessed a tax (which could be filed with the regular state income tax 
in states that have one) on all income above a $2,000 per person ex 
emption, at a rate equal to that of the payroll tax, up to a point at which 
a fair premium has been paid. Any payroll tax already paid on an in 
dividual's behalf would be credited dollar-for-dollar against income tax 
owed. The self-employed would, as a result of this income tax, have 
the same responsibility in providing for their own insurance that 
employers have for employees. 9 This income tax (or income-based 
premium) places a rather heavy burden on the poor among the current 
uninsured. Despite this, we will see that it raises relatively little revenue.
To estimate who ends up with public coverage, the CPS sample of 
individuals must first be grouped into family units that would be kept 
together for insurance purposes. Each unit is classified as either already 
having public coverage, retaining or picking up private coverage, or 
(the residual) entering the new public program. In general, family units 
are put in the private insurance group if earnings are high enough (singly 
or in combination) that payroll taxes paid in 1988 would be at least as 
large as 80 percent of the estimated 1988 premium for a qualified plan. 
Workers who do not meet this test but already have employment-based 
coverage are assumed to keep it, if all members of the family unit have 
coverage and the employer pays at least part of the cost. This last assump 
tion is optimistic, as surely some of those employers would drop 
coverage. 10
The results of the analysis for Michigan, as reported in Table 1, show 
substantial enrollments in the new public program, both because many 
of the current uninsured fail to gain private coverage (even with tax 
rates as high as 20 percent), and because many of the insured shift over. 
According to the March 1988 CPS, the total number of uninsured under
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age 65 in Michigan is about 870,000. n The estimated enrollment in 
the new program ranges from 1.2 million with a 10 percent tax to 
770,000 if the tax is 20 percent. At the lower rate, only about 200,000 
of the state's uninsured gain employment-based coverage, while about 
490,000 of the insured move to public coverage. At the 20 percent rate, 
about 520,000 of the uninsured would gain coverage from employers, 
but about two-thirds of that number (320,000) would be leaving their 
current coverage to enter the public program.
Table 1
Numbers Gaining Public Coverage (100,000s) 
Illustration for Michigan
Tax rate









SOURCES. March 1988 CPS for Michigan and author's assumptions about participation
Table 2 shows the expected age composition of the public program 
at each of the tax rates, along with comparative data on the composi 
tion of the Michigan population under age 65 and the Michigan unin 
sured population. The composition of the group does not change much 
as the tax rate changes, but it does look rather different from the cur 
rent uninsured population. In particular, those aged 15 to 20 or over 
44 would form a considerably larger share of the new program 
enrollments than they do of the current uninsured population. Both 
subgroups contain relatively large numbers of insured individuals who 
would find public coverage an attractive alternative. In the younger 
subgroup, many are 18 to 20 years of age and not in school, but ap 
parently covered under parents' policies. The size of the public pro 
gram could be kept down to some degree by broadening the definition 
of dependent and requiring that some of these individuals continue to 
be covered through their parents. Table 2 also shows that a relatively 
large share of uninsured males aged 26 to 44 would gain employment- 
based insurance and therefore not require public coverage.
Table 2 
Composition of the New Public Program (Percent by Age Group)




















































SOURCES. March 1988 CPS for Michigan and author's assumptions about participation.
3
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Gross costs for the new public program under different assumptions 
about its size and the benefit package are reported in Table 3. The cost 
numbers are based on my calculations using data from Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield of Michigan in its Area Rated Groups line of business, sold mainly 
to small firms. The Basic Package is traditional Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
coverage, covering mainly inpatient hospital care and associated pro 
fessional services. The Expanded Package adds major medical coverage 
of a broader set of services with deductible and copayment provisions, 
as well as coverage of prescription drugs with low copayments. Some 
advantages of these numbers are that they are based on actual cost ex 
perience, not premiums, and were available by age category. Using 
them does not imply that public coverage would have to be of this type.
Table 3
Gross and Net Costs of the New Public Program ($100 millions) 
Illustration for Michigan
Tax rate




























SOURCES: Author's calculations from March 1988 CPS for Michigan and Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
of Michigan 1988 cost experience for Area Rated Groups line of business
Costs amount to a little more than $900 per enrollee per year for the 
Basic Package, and about $1,150 for the Expanded Package (in both 
cases, a little higher for the population mix at the 20 percent tax rate). 
If other estimates are available and believed more appropriate, they could 
of course be easily substituted. See chapter 6 for additional discussion 
of costs of coverage and their relationship to the benefit package offered.
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Table 3 also includes estimates of tax revenues the entire program 
package would generate, and then nets these out against gross program 
costs. Payroll tax revenues fall as the tax rate increases, as substantial 
ly more firms choose to provide coverage rather than pay the tax. In 
come tax revenues increase with the tax rate, but still amount to only 
about $150 per year per enrollee at the high 20 percent rate. Most of 
those who end up in the public program under this tax rate are quite 
poor, and frequently they would have no income tax liability due to 
payroll taxes already paid on their behalf.
The bottom line net costs to state government (in 1989 dollars) range 
from about $330 million with the Basic Package and 20 percent tax rate 
to about $830 million with the Expanded Package and 10 percent rate. 
These figures are after netting out payroll tax and extra income tax 
revenues the program would generate. Universal coverage is not cheap. 
To put the numbers in some perspective, each $100 million would 
amount to about $12 for each Michigan resident under age 65, or would 
require adding roughly 0.13 percent to the state's broad-based income 
tax, currently at 4.6 percent.
The experience in other states would of course be different, but not 
necessarily more favorable. The Medicaid program already covers a 
larger share of Michigan's poor population than is the case in most states. 
The share of the state's under-65 population without insurance is well 
below the national average. Based on 1986 and 1987 CPS numbers, 
the national share was over 17 percent compared with about 12 percent 
in Michigan.
Concluding Comments
The net costs to state government of taking this path to universal 
coverage, as identified in the previous section, do not all represent a 
net increase in medical services provided in the state. It is very likely 
that, with better financial access to medical care, the previously unin 
sured will consume more medical services than they currently do. But 
they use some care now, and pay some of the cost of it out of their 
own pockets. Much of that cost for the uninsured who are poor 
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would be shifted to the public sector. The same is true for those poor 
families now paying for their own insurance but who would switch to 
public coverage. Thus a share of the added costs to state government 
would really represent a shift from the uninsured and other poor families 
to the general taxpayer.
Much of the care currently received by the uninsured is also paid 
for in other less explicit ways, by providers accepting lower returns 
than they otherwise would, and by other payers paying more for the 
care received, to help cover the costs of care given to those who cannot 
pay. If state and local governments are already making payments for 
such uncompensated care, these could be folded into the new program 
and would reduce the amount of new revenue to be raised. To the ex 
tent that employers are now paying for uncompensated care, a system 
of universal coverage should bring downward pressure on the cost of 
employer-provided insurance. However, how the gains from a signifi 
cant reduction in uncompensated care would be distributed among pro 
viders and various payers is not well understood.
Getting to universal coverage by expanding and supplementing the 
employment-based insurance system would not be easy, and would very 
likely require a significant increase in a state government's budget. No 
state should embark on this path unless it is willing to face that fact. 
But given a strong commitment to coverage for all, the necessary budget 
increase is not entirely outside the range of plausibility, and it is cer 
tainly far smaller than what would be needed for a Canadian model state 
health plan.
The costs of financing a combined public-private system at the point 
of implementation are surely an important factor affecting its political 
feasibility. What is probably more important, however, for the long- 
run success of such an approach is whether it can be implemented in 
a way that promotes a better balance between cost and quality im 
provements in health care, or whether it would merely add to already 
formidable pressures for ever-increasing costs.
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NOTES
1. See the comments of Johnston on the proposal by the National Leadership Commission on 
Health Care (Johnston and Remhardt 1989).
2 Viewing the Enthoven-Kromck proposal as merely a way of achieving universal insurance 
coverage does not do justice to the plan. It includes provisions (including a restructuring of ex 
isting tax subsidies for employer-provided insurance) aimed at harnessing market forces to pro 
mote cost containment and quality assurance in health care.
3 A recent survey of the membership of the National Association of Manufactures (Higgms 
and Co 1989) found that 84 percent opposed mandated employer-provided health insurance, despite 
the fact that over 99 percent of the respondents were already providing health insurance benefits 
to their employees.
4. A national proposal by the National Leadership Commission on Health Care (1989) also has 
this feature.
5. Clearly this is true when workers are unionized, but even if not, it is in the firm's interest 
to provide a compensation package that is of most value to the worker for a given level of cost.
6. In the current environment, insurers usually insist on this to guard against the possibility that 
only bad health risks will choose to take coverage Under the kind of program being discussed, 
the state would not want to permit individualized decisions for fear that bad risks would be push 
ed into public coverage to keep the employer's private insurance costs low.
7. It should be noted, however, that there would be no adverse employment effects for very young 
low-wage workers if they are expected to get insurance coverage through their parents
8. Earnings and income figures in the March 1988 CPS are for 1987 I have updated them roughly 
to 1989 by increasing them by 6 percent Estimates of the cost of coverage are also updated to 1989.
9. In this quantitative analysis, taxes paid by the self-employed with sufficiently high incomes 
are counted as part of payroll taxes
10. In more detail, the classification scheme works as follows A family unit does not enter the 
new public program if it is- (a) a single individual in an existing public program, or with earnings 
sufficient to pay $800 annually in payroll tax, or with group health already in his or her own 
name, for which an employer bears at least part of the cost, (b) a two-adult couple in which one 
member has earnings sufficient to pay $1,600 annually in payroll tax, or each individually meets 
the conditions in (a), (c) a family with children in which the head or spouse has earnings suffi 
cient to pay $2,000 annually in payroll tax, or all members are currently covered, either by public 
programs or group health (for which an employer of the head or spouse pays at least part of the 
cost), or all but the head or spouse are covered by public programs and the remaining individual 
meets the conditions in (a)
11. This number is a good deal lower than that obtained from other recent waves of the CPS 
and may be an underestimate See discussion by Moyer (1989) and Swartz and Purcell (1989)
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